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In this paper, we want to bring together two issues for their mutual illumination: (i) the particular 
use of that hoary Indian dyad, “nāma-rūpa”, literally, “name-and-form by Buddhaghosa, the 
influential 5th c Theravāda writer, to organize the categories of the abhidhamma, the canonical 
classification of phenomenal factors (dhammas) and their formulaic ordering;1 and (ii) an 
interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology. We argue that Buddhaghosa does not use 
abhidhamma as a reductive ontological division of the human being into mind and body, but as 
the contemplative structuring of that human’s phenomenology. This phenomenological 
methodology expressed in his application of nāma-rūpa is expressed as a set of contemplative 
practices; we compare this approach to some of the processes explicated within the 20th c 
Western Phenomenological tradition’s predominantly metaphysical teleology. We suggest that 
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Buddhaghosa’s use of nāma-rūpa should be seen as the analytic by which he understands how 
experience is undergone, and not his account of how some reality is structured. We can learn 
from Buddhaghosa something about both how experience is to be analyzed, and how that 
analysis has a clarificatory purpose not tied to the espousal of any particular ‘view’ of reality. 
 
Phenomenology and metaphysics 
This paper is not about metaphysics, although it draws attention to how it depends on 
what one says metaphysics is not. Modern Western philosophy has tended to proceed through 
claims to break with the entire history of philosophy. As Kant pointed out, Hume said both that 
“metaphysics couldn’t possibly exist” and that metaphysics and morals are the most important 
branches of learning.2 Kant himself asked whether “metaphysics was possible at all” (§ 4); he 
answered in the affirmative but only after re-defining what it could possibly be. In the 
Phenomenological tradition, Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida and Levinas, all battle with 
the relationship between metaphysics and phenomenology, their understanding of each shifting 
with their argument for an original understanding of metaphysics.3 We do not intend to engage 
with that history and the validity of successive judgments (is metaphysics about “presence” and 
was Husserl committed to it, while Derrida broke free of it as he claims? and so on), let alone 
with the even more complex question of how to read “metaphysics” in the context of Indian 
thought. But we start with what we hope is a plausible if diffuse stipulation: metaphysics is about 
how things are and come to be what they are (on whatever construal of “things” and “is”); in 
short, it is concerned with questions of existence, while a metaphysical argument is one directed 
towards determining how those things are what they are. By “ontology,” we mean the 
articulation of the structure of entities such as objects and relations. An ontology is, in this sense, 
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part of a metaphysical enterprise, whereas, there can be metaphysical questions that are not 
ontological. In that sense, a dominant strain of 20thc Phenomenology does preserve a 
fundamental metaphysical reflex, for its purpose is in some way to determine the nature of the 
subject of experience of world. By way of contrast, on our reading of Buddhaghosa, he is not 
oriented to such determination at all, but rather seeks to train attention towards experience in 
such a way is to make the perfection of such attention itself the purpose of the training. 
 The Phenomenological tradition is in a fundamental sense a response to Kant: as Zahavi 
observes from Michel Henry’s perspective at the end of the 20thc, “[T]here is a common leitmotif 
in Kant’s, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy. All of these philosophers have, despite all the 
other differences that might prevail, had a common aim, namely to analyse the conditions of 
possibility for appearance or manifestation…”4 Manifestation being the appearance of something 
for someone, the condition for its possibility must lie in the subject for which there is 
manifestation. It is, in Kant’s term, “transcendental” because it is the condition for that 
possibility. But then there is a problem. “The (transcendental) subject that must be taken into 
account if we are to speak of an appearance that does not itself appear, is not itself a 
phenomenon. But although this option might have been available to Kant, it is not available to 
the phenomenologists. To deny that transcendental subjectivity manifests itself, is to deny the 
possibility of a phenomenological analysis of transcendental subjectivity. And to deny that, is to 
deny the possibility of transcendental phenomenology altogether.”5 So, on Henry’s analysis, 
phenomenology must go beyond its study of manifestation to the subjectivity that renders 
manifestation possible. “[A]ll of the major phenomenological thinkers eventually realized that it 
would be necessary to transcend a mere analysis of act-intentionality and object-manifestation if 
they were to approach and clarify the phenomenological question concerning the condition of 
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possibility for manifestation…”6  
 And that is exactly the point at which we make a contrast with Buddhaghosa’s purpose in 
analyzing experience. Phenomenologist have frequently taken “the question” to be the 
determination of a transcendental subject, and because of that, do not wish to remain focused on 
manifestation itself. “The task of phenomenology is not to describe the objects as precisely and 
meticulously as possible, nor should it occupy itself with an investigation of the phenomena in 
all their ontic diversity. No, its true task is to examine their very appearance or manifestation and 
to disclose its condition of possibility.”7 Buddhaghosa, however, does seek to “describe the 
objects [of experience] as precisely and meticulously as possible”, but not to determine either 
objects in their “ontic diversity” nor a transcendental subject that makes experience possible.  
In effect, our task is three-fold when it comes to outlining a Buddhaghosan 
phenomenology. First, we must show that he does occupy himself with a close, analytic 
description of phenomena. Second, we need to argue that that description is not ontological, that 
it is not concerned to determine the nature of the objects of experience, since that would be 
irrelevant to his project of “purification” (visuddhi). Finally, and building on the previous two 
points, we have to show that the absence of a phenomenological quest for transcendental 
subjectivity in Buddhaghosa does not mean either that he lacks a phenomenological 
methodology or that he offers an alternative metaphysics of subjectivity (while it is true that he 
has a Buddhist commitment to the denial of a unitary subject).  
There is doubtless a separate argument to be had whether his doctrinal commitments as a 
Buddhist imply a metaphysics; a question perhaps better directed at the Buddha’s own teachings, 
which criticize the holding of “views” but may be taken as ultimately holding a view of reality. 
As a Buddhist, then, Buddhaghosa has doctrinal commitments, about whose nature there can be a 
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debate. But even if those commitments are held to be metaphysical for reason of being about 
how things truly are, they frame but do not enter the content of Buddhaghosa’s project. The 
purificatory consequence of these practices is anti-metaphysical, in that they enable the 
meditator to discern no need for adherence to a metaphysical subject (“no being, a person, a god, 
or a brahmā” (XVIII.24)), but this consequence is nothing like a metaphysical argument; it is a 
transformation of attitude. The monk “arrives at the conclusion” (niṭṭhaṃ gacchati) that there is 
no such person. This general programme of guiding the meditator through a carefully elaborated 
series of contemplative practices so that he is corrected in the way he sees the world is evident 
throughout the Visuddhimagga,8 and attention to it demonstrates that Buddhaghosa should not be 
seen as developing specific metaphysical arguments about the nature of the subject (as non-self).  
Perhaps one particular interpretive contrast should be pointed out. Dan Zahavi stresses 
that Phenomenology’s “reflective exploration” is an investigation of “the significance and 
appearance of the real world, not of some otherworldly mental realm.”9 This is an unavoidable 
line to take given the birth of Phenomenology as a response to early modern Western 
metaphysics. We seek to show that the question of the ontological status of the “real world” in 
contrast to a “mental real” does not arise in Buddhaghosa’s program at all. He clearly engages 
with the world in which the monk finds himself, as we will see; but its status is not a problem. 
His phenomenological methodology is not then a descriptive psychology that requires thinking 
of the elements of analysis and description as “mental” in contrast to “the world” – in precise 
point of fact, our aim is to demonstrate that such an assumption would be misleading. 
Buddhaghosa should therefore be read thus: He is anti-metaphysical in the sense that (as 
we will see) he follows the Buddha’s teaching that one should not hold ‘views’ (the sixty-two 
that the Buddha criticized), and offers a process to therapeutize the practitioner away from such 
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commitments. At the same time, and consonant with this, since his thoroughgoing 
phenomenological methodology means his project is given over to the contemplation of an 
analysis of experience, he offers nothing positive or negative on what an ontology might be that 
was consistent with his phenomenological methodology (as, perhaps later writers in his tradition 
developed). It might be that, in this, he is somewhat comparable to the earlier Husserl (of the 
Logical Investigations), who takes himself to be committed to a descriptive phenomenology that 
is ‘neutral’ to metaphysics. But only somewhat: Buddhaghosa does not articulate his rejection of 
‘views’ of reality as being for the development of a methodology neutral to them but as a 
therapeutic response. How this difference in motivation might inform their philosophical 
practices is a question for another day. 
This combination of practice and purpose is clear in the chapter in which Buddhaghosa 
details his use of the nāma-rūpa dyad as a hermeneutic framing of the compositional 
phenomenal factors (dhammas) of the human being as evident in various contemplative 
exercises. It would be thoroughly misleading to approach his treatment as if it were part of a 
homogenous “abhidharma”, and interpret him from the perspective of (contemporary or later) 
Sanskrit Mahāyāna sources, or indeed of later Theravāda; so the often explicit metaphysical 
contention of these other sources should not determine our understanding of Buddhaghosa’s 
treatment of the Pali sources on abhidhamma.  
 
Abhidhamma:  A Clouded History of Interpretation 
Modern scholars have offered contrasting readings of the canonical Abhidhamma, with 
some assuming it describes a metaphysics of ultimate reals, and others challenging this reading; 
sometimes the issue is unclear even in the work of the same scholar. Sue Hamilton, in a 1996 
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work, offers an ontological reading of nāmarūpa that we will refer to in the next section; but in a 
subsequent work of 2000, she suggests that when working with dependent origination at least, 
questions of ontology become irrelevant:  “understanding dependent origination, in the sense that 
subjectivity and objectivity are mutually conditioned, one will no longer ask questions about 
existence,”10 a position we readily endorse.   
Rupert Gethin has been on different sides of this issue, stating of the Abhidharma 
tradition (lumping together the Pali Abhidhamma in this assessment) that dharmas are the 
“physical and mental events” that “are the ultimate building blocks of the way things are.”11  But 
in an earlier work on the five khandhas, he suggests that “the khandhas do not exactly take on 
the character of a formal theory of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an 
analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence 
from the point of view of the experiencing subject.”12  In other words, these categories describe 
subjectivity, not the objects of experience in a manner that has, as he puts it, any “metaphysical 
significance.”13   
Y. Karunadasa, in an influential book, argues that canonical Abhidhamma did not 
succumb to the “error of conceiving the dhammas as ultimate unities or discrete entities.”14  He 
suggests that dhammas be interpreted as “phenomena,” with “the proviso that they are 
phenomena with no corresponding noumena, no hidden underlying ground. For they are not 
manifestations of some mysterious metaphysical substratum, but processes taking place due to 
the interplay of a multitude of conditions.”15  But he argues that as the postcanonical tradition 
developed, the Theravādins took the “dhammas as the final limits of the Abhidhammic analysis 
of empirical existence,” making them “not further reducible to any other entity,” a position 
which made them susceptible to charges of reifying them.16  Yet he finds it possible to speak of 
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given instances of “mind or matter,” as though these may be posited independently of 
dhammas.17 
Noa Ronkin shares Karunadasa’s view that the canonical Abhidhamma system did not 
draw metaphysical conclusions, but she argues that a robustly ontological interpretation of 
dhammas developed in the postcanonical tradition.18 Ronkin holds that the postcanonical 
tradition became more ontological in its interpretations of dhammas by their associating them 
with the idea of sabhāva, a term that bore significant ontological weight in some of the Indian 
traditions, as is well known. Ronkin notes that sabhāva in the canonical tradition was associated 
with salakkhaṇa, and that both terms were used to determine “epistemological and linguistic” 
characteristics of things, rather than naming ontological existents or reals.19 And she notes that 
the Visuddhimagga also does not necessarily endow sabhāva with “ontological significance,” 
though she suggests that its commentary heads in a metaphysical direction.20  Focusing on the 
layer of the Mahāṭīkā, she argues that sabhāva refers to “an ontological determinant” that may 
“accordingly be rendered as individual essence at the level of ontology.”21  This yields a reading 
of dhammas as “ultimately real existents,” and makes the whole Abhidhamma project a matter of 
ontology.22  
While she allows that for his part, Buddhaghosa may not have used sabhāva in an 
ontologically loaded way, she translates a passage from the Atthasālinī (a text attributed to 
Buddhahgosa23) in a way that begs the question, translating dhammas as “ultimate constituents” 
and sabhāva as “self-existents.”24 In another passage she translates sabhāva as “particular 
nature,” and proceeds rhetorically: “does not the very use of the term sabhāva overstress the 
reality of the dhammas and imply that a dhamma is a discrete entity, a ‘thing’ existing in its own 
right?”25 But these terms can easily be translated as “phenomena” or “factors” in the case of 
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dhamma, and “particularity” or “particular way of being” in the case of sabhāva. In fact, 
sabhāva, like salakkhaṇa, is often used in the Visuddhimagga to denote the particular definition 
that distinguishes a dhamma (as well as other things), and so it is a thing’s particularity.  
Therefore, it is not self-evident or indisputable that Buddhaghosa’s use of sabhāva commits him 
to a notion of dhammas as “self-existents” or “discrete things existing in their own right.”  After 
all, Buddhaghosa applies sabhāva to the ten different types of corpses in the corpse meditations 
(as Ronkin herself notes26), as a contemplative tool to note the distinctions among them.  In this 
usage it requires no ontological commitments – nobody seems to want to insist that bloated 
corpses are irreducible ontological reals.  
Finally, Ñāṇamoli’s translation of sabhāva as “individual essence,” is not given without 
significant misgivings on his part, and he insists that he uses it “principally on exegetical 
grounds,” by which we think he means that the translation is as open to interpretation as the 
original text.  He also says that “essence” is an “admittedly slippery customer” which “must be 
understood from the contexts in which it is used and not prejudged.”27  
In Buddhaghosa’s use of it, sabhāva itself can be further broken down, which suggests 
that efforts to make sabhāva indicate an irreducible, ultimate essence will meet with 
inconvenient textual passages in the Visuddhimagga.  We can take feeling (vedanā) as an 
example. There are numerous schemas for analyzing feeling (according to its role in dependent 
origination, as a khandha, as a dhamma, etc.); let us look at two, feeling analyzed as aggregate 
and feeling analyzed as dhamma. Feeling is, according to one analysis, a cetasika, that is, one of 
the dhammas that occur on the lists breaking down moments of experience, but it is also an 
aggregate or composite entity (khandha) that together with the other four aggregates can be used 
to describe human experience. As a khandha or composite entity, it is of course, by definition, 
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further reducible (this of course raises the question of how and in what sense vedanā when 
appearing as a dhamma could be a final irreducible entity). Buddhaghosa says that as one of the 
five aggregates, feeling can be defined variously: 
But though it is singlefold according to its particular way of being (sabhāva) because of 
its characteristic of being felt, it is also threefold by its type:  good, bad, and 
indeterminate…And it is fivefold by dividing its particular way of being (sabhāva) thus:  
pleasure, pain, joy, sadness, and equanimity.28  
Here, feeling itself is further reducible into one, three, or five (elsewhere there are even more 
ways of dividing it, and even at the canonical layer there is resistance to any single, final listing 
of feeling29). And its sabhāva can be further divided into five.  As such it is hard to insist that 
either sabhāva or dhamma must refer to a final irreducible existent or essence arrived at through 
reductive analysis.  Rather, for Buddhaghosa sabhāva refers to the particularity that distinguishes 
feeling from other dhammas and other khandhas, which in the case of feeling, is the 
phenomenological experience of being felt (the sabhāva, like the lakkhaṇa, of a phenomenon is 
usually the verbal form of it); and there are many ways of feeling – pleasurable, painful, etc. If 
either vedanā or sabhāva were primary existents arrived at through final analysis, why are they 
here further reducible? 
Ñāṇamoli is well aware of the same problem as we have discussed, and crisply makes the 
point about dualism. Perhaps once more for ‘exegetical’ reasons – to keep a translational choice 
that had already hardened, yet needed interpretive challenging – he explains that he reluctantly 
chose to keep the translation of rūpa as ‘materiality’ (and ‘nāma’ as ‘mentality’). He says in the 
Introduction to the translation, “’[M]entality-materiality’ for nāma-rūpa is inadequate and 
‘name-and-form’ in some ways preferable. ‘Name’ (see Ch. XVIII, n.4) still suggests nāma’s 
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function of ‘naming’; and ‘form’ for the rūpa of the rūpakkhandha (‘materiality aggregate’) can 
preserve the link with the rūpa of the rūpāyatana, (‘visible-object base”) by rendering them 
respectively with ‘material form aggregate’ and ‘visible form base’—a point not without 
philosophical importance. A compromise has been made at Chapter X.13. ‘Materiality’ or 
‘matter’ wherever used should not be taken as implying any hypostasis, any ‘permanent or 
semipermanent substance behind appearances’ (the objective counterpart of the subjective ego), 
which would find no support in the Pali.”30 He himself does not expand here on what this ‘point 
not without philosophical importance” might be; but we suggest that this paper develops just 
such a case. 
We thus see a mixed recent history of interpretations of the Abhidhamma and its 
commentaries. While in some quarters the question of a metaphysical reading of Abhidhamma is 
assumed to be settled,31 we also find compelling and interesting suggestions of a 
phenomenological reading to be widespread, and strangely enough, in the thoughts of the 
authoritative translator of the Visuddhimagga itself. For our purposes, we must also note the 
absence of any systematic and close study of Buddhaghosa’s work on this question in recent 
scholarship. None of the above-mentioned scholars on whose work some of the received wisdom 
on this question is based treat the Visuddhimagga or the other works attributed to Buddhaghosa 
systematically, and what they do say about him leaves much room for further investigation. We 
suggest that in light of this cloudy scholarly history of interpretation of the Pali Abhidhamma, 
and the absence of any systematic study of Buddhaghosa’s particular interpretation of it, it is 
time for a reassessment of the question. Taking up the foundational ideas of nāmarūpa, which 




Nāma-rūpa: outline of the standard interpretation 
We are therefore looking at how we might move away from the tendency to see 
nāmarūpa in terms of a dualistic ontology of “mind-and-body,” or its various affiliates, flowing 
from a generally metaphysical interpretation of the abhidhamma categories (such as the 
‘aggregates’ (khandhas) which are divided into one class of rūpa and four of nāma):  “mental 
and material,” “sentience and body,” “the psychophysical complex,” and so on.33  Even scholars 
careful to keep to the more accurate translations of nāmarūpa as “name and form,” have 
sometimes worked these into a metaphysical account of the human being where the 
disaggregative project of analyses for dismantling selfhood produces an account of smaller 
constituent parts which are then affirmed as reals. Steven Collins, for example, states that 
“Buddhist doctrine continues the style of analysis into non-valued impersonal constituents: it is 
precisely the point of not-self that this is all that there is to human individuals;” and he specifies 
that the impersonal constituents that remain to the human individual are such things as “the two-
fold “name-and-form” (nāmarūpa).”34  Sue Hamilton argues that nāmarūpa is “the 
individualising, or abstract identity, of the human being.” It indicates the “comprehensive 
designation of the individuality of a human being,” that is, “the point at which that individual, 
having become associated with the potential for being conscious, acquires identity in terms of 
name and form.”35 Nāmarūpa is the seat of an individual’s identity. 
By contrast, for Buddhaghosa (and the interpretation of the canonical sources that he 
urges), nāmarūpa is one analytical distinction (among many) that can be used to observe 
experience, but that it does not identify a metaphysical reality or basis of an individual. One of 
the prominent roles of nāmarūpa is its functioning as the fourth link in the 12-fold chain of 
dependent origination (the twelve links are: ignorance, intentional constructions, awareness [or 
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in various contexts, more specifically, “directed cognition,” viññāṇa], name and form, the six 
senses, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, aging-and-death). Buddhaghosa 
claims that the teaching of dependent origination is “a profound teaching that should be given in 
various ways for various purposes, and none but those with the knowing of omniscience can be 
established in this knowledge;”36 certainly, the scope of his treatment of the topic in Vism XVII 
is far beyond our concern here. But one of the uses of dependent origination that he describes at 
length is to teach an “explanation of the round” (vaṭṭakathā), and here the issue of how 
nāmarūpa has been conceived in the sequence of events of rebirth has been cited by some of 
these scholars as evidence of nāmarūpa referring to a composite entity or identity of the human 
person.  They cite Buddhaghosa’s account of the rebirth process as support for the notion that 
nāmarūpa is an entity that appears in the womb.  Within the midst of a much larger discussion of 
these processes, Buddhaghosa says 
Therein the “rebirth which is awareness” means that awareness is said to be rebirth 
because of the arising of the next being to be reborn.  “Name and form develop (or 
“descend”)” means that there is the entering, as it were, of the form and formless 
dhammas which have approached the womb—this is name and form. The “actualities that 
are sensitivity” refer to the five actualities of eye, etc.37 
On the basis of this passage in a reading that emphasizes the idea of the “descent” of a new being 
in the womb, Collins suggests that “it is at the moment when these elements have already been 
conjoined, and the psycho-physical unity of the embryo (“name-and-form”) is thus formed, that 
there is said to be descent.”38 For those scholars who would see nāmarūpa signifying the entity 
or identity of an individual, this passage appears to describe its beginning and gestation.  
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 We propose instead that the passage is describing the processes of rebirth in the womb as 
a development, in the mutually conditioning formula that is dependent origination, of the 
particular processes this formula describes:  here we learn of the development of awareness, the 
beginnings of the phenomenal factors (dhammas) that can be described as name and form, and 
the sense actualities as they begin to emerge. Nāmarūpa is a way of describing dhammas by 
classifying those that have form and those that are formless; we can observe that the embryo has 
dhammas (such as feeling) that can be described as nāma, and aspects of form and formation that 
we can refer to as rūpa.  This does not entail that name and form here identify, over and above 
the processes structuring human life in the womb or out of it, the two-fold unity or identity of the 
embryo.  Nāmarūpa is used in the dependent origination formula as an analytically useful way to 
interpret mutually conditioning relationships:  the factors classified as nāmarūpa are conditioned 
by awareness, and in turn condition the six senses. For reasons which become clear below, for 
Buddhaghosa, name and form are analytical terms used to discern two sides of human 
phenomenology, but themselves do not constitute an ontological category. 
“Seeing” and the significance of not “resorting to views” 
 Buddhaghosa’s exploration of nāmarūpa in Vism XVIII casts it as an existential and 
contemplative practice of “purifying view” (diṭṭhivisuddhi).  In the broadest sense, this exercise 
takes place within the Understanding (paññā) section of the three-fold path that is the Path of 
Purification (Visuddhimagga), a text that articulates a progressive contemplative journey 
culminating in understanding. Understanding occurs on the foundation of the other two parts of 
the path, cultivating morality/virtue (sīla) and concentration (samādhi).  By this point, 
Buddhaghosa has already spelt out that “understanding is the act of understanding”;39 so he is 
not so much concerned with what one knows (an epistemological state determined by 
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propositional content) but instead with how one knows (a transformation in knowing the world). 
Paññā involves a set of practices that shift how the practitioner “knows and sees” 
(ñāṇadassana), and it is a matter of insight (vipassana).  Buddhaghosa asserts, first, that the task 
at hand is a matter of purifying view, and second, he enjoins the meditator to engage in correct 
seeing (yathābhūtadassana).  
Purifying view is one of five purifications performed by the advanced meditator, and 
“purifying view means seeing correctly name and form.”40 Seeing the working of nāmarūpa is 
the way one comes to purify view.  Buddhaghosa articulates the purification of view not as a 
matter of adhering to right viewpoints, but rather as involving a shift in how one sees, that is, 
how one comes to “see correctly”. 
The chapter also signals that it is describing and guiding a transformative exercise of 
seeing when it draws a contrast between “seeing correctly” (yathābhūtadassana) and “resorting 
to views” (diṭṭhigata).41  At XVIII. 28, he says that “there comes to be the mere common usage 
of ‘chariot’” (ratho ti vohāramattaṃ hoti) from its parts but that an ‘examination’ (upaparikkhā) 
shows that ultimately there is no chariot.  
Likewise, when there are the five aggregates of clinging, then there comes to be the mere 
common usage of ‘a being’, ‘person’; but in the further sense, when each dhamma is 
examined, there is no being that is the foundation for assuming ‘I am’ or ‘I’. In the 
further sense, there is only name-form. The vision of one who sees thus is called ‘seeing 
correctly.’42  
Clearly, the “examination” here is reflexive, because it is of the “aggregates of clinging.” 
“Clinging” is a phenomenological fact, this is what is experienced. And seeing correctly is to see 
16 
 
through the experience of clinging to how the sense of being a substantial person occurs because 
of clinging to the aggregates. It is this “seeing correctly” that Buddhaghosa contrasts to the 
discredit of “resorting to views,” by invoking the Buddha’s criticism, thereby making the 
contrast between the two clear. 
Buddhaghosa quotes the Buddha on this point: 
Here the Bhagavan said:  “some gods and humans are obsessed by two ways of resorting 
to views:  some hold back, some overreach, and only those with eyes see. And how, 
monks, do some hold back?  Monks, gods and humans delight in being (or becoming), 
are intent on being, take pleasure in being. When the Dhamma is taught to them for the 
sake of the cessation of being, their awareness does not take to it, or become calm, 
settled, or inclined to it.  These are those, monks, who hold back.  And how, monks, do 
some overreach?  Some are anxious, disaffected, and disgusted by that same being, and 
they take pleasure in cutting off being, saying “at the breakup of the body, the self is 
destroyed and perishes, and is nothing further after death – this is peace, this is 
fulfillment, this is truth.” These are those, monks, who overreach. And how, monks, do 
those with eyes see?  Here, monks, a monk sees what has become as become.  Having 
seen what has become as become, he reaches disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation 
for what has become.  In this way, monks, those with eyes see.”43 
The passage contrasts those who are, in one way or another, obsessed with views of the world 
(that either affirm or deny its reality and value) with those who come to see how things are 
present to their experience. The latter achieve the transformation valued by the teleological 
ambitions of the text.  This suggests that Buddhaghosa’s purpose here (and elsewhere) is not to 
arrive at views (diṭṭhi) but rather at a shift in ways of seeing (dassana).  In his terms, “purifying 
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view” means getting rid of adherence to views so that one might have “eyes that see.” Through 
his specific invocation of the difference between “diṭṭhi” – “view” – and “dassana” – “seeing” or 
“viewing – we are drawn into seeing that “view” – i.e., a view-point – is not the same as 
“viewing” – i.e., the continual act of purified seeing .  
 This framing of his inquiry into nāmarūpa as being about seeing is significant because it 
implies that what is said about this topic is not for the purpose of achieving a viewpoint or 
position about reality.  The distinction above serves as a propaedeutic to his phenomenological 
practice – the structured attending to experience. We should remember that the practice is not 
only not for the purpose of arriving at conclusions about how things ultimately are, it is in fact 
directed towards developing the capacity to not seek such conclusions. Learning to observe 
experience in new ways is explicitly a protection against the existential problematic that the 
Buddha identified as “resorting to views”. It would then be a flat contradiction to see 
Buddhaghosa as advancing a metaphysics in his treatment of nāma-rūpa.  
 Despite the recognition of the metaphysical intent of the 20th c Phenomenological 
tradition, there is also a contemporary interpretation (in a minor key, to be sure) that at its most 
fundamental, phenomenology is a method and not a metaphysics. This is eloquently and 
pointedly put by David Carr. “Contrary to the widely accepted interpretation of Heidegger, 
transcendental philosophy is not a metaphysical doctrine or theory, but a critique of metaphysics, 
of science, and of the experience that underlies them. A critique is not a theory but a research 
program or method, a way of looking at and interrogating experience so as to bring to the surface 
its deepest-lying, uncritically accepted assumptions.”44 This account of phenomenology as the 
interrogation of experience – albeit for a goal radically beyond the reach of philosophical 
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investigation alone – comes closest to our reading of Buddhaghosa, and at least shows that there 
is nothing conceptually incoherent about a phenomenology without a metaphysical argument. 
The fact that metaphysical treatments of abhidhamma/abhidharma include 
phenomenological practices (as in Sarvāstivāda) does not imply the converse – that 
Buddhaghosa’s phenomenological practice has to be for a metaphysical purpose. That the two go 
together is the dominant understanding of phenomenology; that they can be de-linked is the 
crucial point about phenomenology as critical methodology. 
 
Nāma and rūpa under the analysis of the aggregates: the phenomenological case for the 
khandhas 
While it is in Chapter XVIII that Buddhaghosa deals with nāma-rūpa as a theme, in 
typical modular fashion, he describes the constituents of each – without focusing on the dyad as 
such – in Chapter XIV. While we want to study XVIII in detail precisely because that is where 
he thematizes them, it might be useful to clarify that this chapter is not at odds with XIV.  
First of all, we have his connection of rūpa to ruppana, which means literally 
“molested”, “bothered” or “vexed”.  Buddhaghosa does not say here what it is that forms get 
impinged upon in this way, but gives a small clue (XIV.34): “Whatever are the kinds of factors 
that have the characteristic of being bothered by cold, etc., all of them are to be considered 
together and understood as the rūpa aggregate.”45 It is straightaway difficult to see how this 
more naturally fits an ontological reading of the constituents of the rūpa aggregate as material, 
when the definition is clearly phenomenological, as those constituents that undergo (are 
“molested by”) such sensations as cold. 
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Then he goes on to divide rūpa into two categories: the elemental (bhūta) and what is 
‘clung to’ and therefore ‘derived’ (upādāya) (as Ñāṇamoli translates it at XIV.34). The latter 
category intrinsically contains a spiritual implication that these forms are forms because of the 
existential desire – the clinging to – from which freedom is sought through the Buddha’s path.  
Before we look more closely at some exemplary “derived forms,” let us tackle 
Buddhaghosa’s description of the “elemental forms,” which goes back to chapter XI. There, XI. 
87 deals with bhūtas as to their word meaning (vacanattho):  “Then, undifferentiated, they are 
components (dhātus), due to bearing their own characteristics, because of grasping (ādāna) 
suffering, and because of putting out (ādhāna) suffering.”46 Interestingly, the translator 
Ñāṇamoli  has ‘sorting out’ for ādhāna, and refers to XV.19, where in a footnote he draws 
attention to words that have ‘dahati’, ‘to put’ as their root. Although he does not directly mention 
ādhāna there, the reference to this footnote suggests the link. 
Note that the elementals are not presented as objects that cause suffering. Buddhaghosa 
does not deny that they may be; it is simply not his concern to determine them in that way. He 
understands them in terms of their being grasped and the way they can be utilized to put out 
suffering. Even earth, water and the like engage Buddhaghosa’s attention via their 
phenomenological role. (To reiterate: this says nothing about whether there is or ought to be a 
commitment to the ontological status of these entities, only that Buddhaghosa’s deployment of 
them is within a purely phenomenological methodology.) 




“He should advert to the four elements in this way: “What are the characteristic, function, 
manifestation of the earth elemental?” The earth elemental has the characteristic of 
hardness. Its function is to act as a foundation. It is manifested as receptivity. The water 
elemental has the characteristic of flowing. Its function is to spread. It is manifested as 
accumulating. The fire elemental has the characteristic of heat. Its function is to bring to 
maturity. It is manifested as a regulation of softness. The air elemental has the 
characteristic of distending. Its function is to cause motion. It is manifested as acting 
outward.”47 
What brings out Buddhaghosa’s phenomenological orientation is his standard utilization of not 
only description by function, but also by characteristic and manifestation. We should resist the 
temptation to think that this is one side of a subjective-objective divide, because when we turn to 
how he deals with the characteristic of each elemental, we note in fact that he details the quality 
of their feel: hardness and the like. So we can be sure that Buddhaghosa is not treating this 
crucial type of a crucial category of abhidhamma – one which, if anywhere, we might find a 
robust ontology – as a metaphysical postulate. 
From this, let us turn to the “derived forms,” that are contingent upon our existential 
reflex of clinging to an assumed reality. They are of twenty-four kinds: eye, ear, nose, tongue, 
body, the visible form (rūpa), sound, odor, taste (rasa), the feminine faculty (itthindriya), the 
masculine faculty (purusindriya), life faculty (jīvitindriya), the heart-substance (hadayavatthu), 
bodily intimation (kāyaviññati), verbal intimation, the spatial component (ākāsadhātu), the 
lightness of formation (rūpassa lahutā), its malleability (mudutā), pliability (kammaññatā), 
growth, continuity, ageing, and impermanence; and material food (XIV. 36). All twenty-four 
kinds function in phenomenological analysis through the use of the notion of “sensitivity” 
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(pasāda), that is to say, the receptivity of bodily awareness. The list of the functions of the five 
sensory formations – in terms of sensitivity – is correlated with a list of the structural locations of 
each sensory sensitivity (note that this means Buddhaghosa has no interest in revising or 
asserting anything about the ordinary features of body and world). The nose (39) has the 
characteristic of sensitivity to the impact (abhighāta) of smell, and the desire to smell is the 
source of the activity by which smelling originates. Then, to correlate with 39, the nose (50) has 
an inside shaped like a “goat’s hoof,” and is both the substantial basis (vatthu) of, as well as the 
entrance (dvāra) for, nasal cognition. Similarly, at 41 with the body (and we see a narrow 
meaning of ‘body’ here as the surface for sensation): it has the characteristic of sensitivity to the 
impact of the tangible (phoṭṭhabba), the desire for touch being the source of its activity. And in 
turn, the location of that bodily sensitivity (52) is to be found throughout the body, so long as 
there are ‘formations that are ‘clung-to’’ (upādiṇṇarūpaṃ), that is, when desire drives the search 
for sensation. (Phenomenology includes moral phenomenology, where the moral is that which 
arcs towards perfection, which is freedom from desire.)  
A more abstract entity is the faculty of life (jīvitindriya) (59) whose ‘characteristic is the 
maintenance of conascent formations’ (sahajarūpānupālalakkhaṇaṃ). Its function is to make 
these formations that are born together to occur (pavatta) at all. Here too one finds the advantage 
of Buddhaghosa’s discerning restriction of analysis to the functional. 
And although it has the capacity characterized as maintenance and so on, it only 
maintains conascent formations at that present moment, as water does lotuses, etc. 
Though factors (dhamma) arise due to their own conditions, it maintains them, as a wet-
nurse does a prince. And it occurs itself only through its connection with the occurrent 
factors, like a ship’s captain; it does not cause occurrence after dissolution…Yet it must 
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not be regarded as devoid of the power to maintain, bring about, and make present, 
because it does accomplish each of these functions at a stated moment.48 (59) 
On the one hand, it is important to associate phenomena with life, in the formal terms that 
distinguish body from corpse; so we have what life means for contemplative analysis. On the 
other hand, since that is all that is needed for the path, we need not expect either a scientific or a 
metaphysical drilling down to what life ‘is’. 
These are some of the examples from Buddhaghosa’s extended analysis of the derived 
forms/formations. His treatment of them evidently points to a subtle approach that does not 
betoken the compilation of an ontological list. It is self-evident to all but a pathological (rather 
than methodological) sceptic that the physical is present in the phenomenological; so we are not 
at all making the claim that Buddhaghosa denies how the world is present in experience (that 
would simply make him a metaphysical idealist). Since even defenders of an ontological 
construal of nāma and rūpa would more likely want to be sure that it is rūpa whose 
phenomenological construal in Buddhaghosa is clear, rather than nāma or what he also calls 
arūpa, we can spend less time on nāma. The cognition aggregate – viññāṇa – is the lead amongst 
the nāma aggregates. The remaining three follow the same pattern, as Buddhaghosa himself 
says: “Here, once the cognition aggregate is understood, the rest are easily understood too” 
(XIV.81). It has a richer, more complex typology in the abhidhamma than the formation 
aggregate. But despite the analytic distinction between the ‘body’ formations and the ‘mental’ 
aggregates, the abhidhamma aggregates altogether contain within them a constant percolation of 
causal references between each other, destabilizing any intuitions we moderns may have about a 




His primary concern is with contemplative practice, rather than laying out a mind-body 
ontology, as in clear in how Buddhaghosa deals with two critical components of the cognition 
aggregate, “mind” (mano) and “mind-cognition” (manoviññāṇa).  The ‘mind’ has the function of 
“reception” (sampaṭicchana) and “mental cognition” the function of “investigation” (santīraṇa): 
The mind component has the characteristic of taking cognizance of the visible, etc., [the 
data of the sense organs] immediately after visual cognition, etc., itself.49 The component 
of mental cognition, with the operation of investigation, has the characteristic of taking 
cognizance of the six [types of] objects (i.e., including the mental).50 (97)  
What is demonstrated here is that, yet again, given an opportunity to define what a mind is, we 
have Buddhaghosa dealing with the category only in terms of how it functions: more precisely, 
its phenomenological function. 
 Having now looked at the leading nāma or arūpa aggregate, we can set aside the other 
aggregates, which obviously follow this same pattern of analysis, and finally turn to the 
thematization of nāma and rūpa directly in Chapter XVIII. 
 
Seeing nāma and rūpa 
The way in which Buddhaghosa uses “name” and “form” emerges through a study of his 
description of contemplative practices with and on them. The exercises described by chapter 
XVIII can be structured into three main parts. 1. The meditator engages in techniques of 
discernment and definition in order to attend to the nāma and rūpa of experience. 2. Having 
developed these techniques, the meditator engages in the dismantling of the tendency to see 
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some essence, a personhood, over and above the observed processes of nāma and rūpa. 3. 
Finally, the meditator comes to see the inextricable interdependence of nāma and rūpa.   
We will later consider the contemplation of “name” and “form”, which itself can be 
divided into three types: (i) starting with awareness focused on (a) name, one moves to form, and 
(b) vice versa; (ii) contemplation of the mutual enfolding of name and form of experiences as 
taxonomized variously through (a) the eighteen “elements” (dhātus), (b) the twelve “actuating 
bases” (āyatanas) or (c) the five “aggregates (khandhas); and (iii) working on forms through one 
of three aspects of “name” – contact (phassa), feeling (vedanā) or directed cognition (viññāṇa) – 
if the naming does not directly arise in contemplative focus. In each of these exercises one is 
coming to identify factors under name or form. 
Under (i), Buddhaghosa starts with exercises aimed at advanced meditators who are 
proficient in either calming (samatha) practices or insight (vipassana).  The task is to discern 
(pariggaheti) and define (vavatthapeti) the workings of nāma and rūpa.  One should start from 
one of them to come gradually to observe the workings of the other. “One should discern, 
according to characteristic, function, etc. the constituents of ‘absorption’ that consist of applied 
thought, etc. and the factors (dhammas) associated with them.”51  The “constituents of 
absorption” (jhānāṅgas) are: the initial application of thought (vitakka), sustained inquiry 
(vicāra), delight (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and concentration (samādhi). At least some of these 
dhammas occur in every moment of awareness. With these come the phenomenal factors 
associated with (sampayutta) them, like feeling and conception. Discernment is through the 
standard fourfold definitional practice that Buddhaghosa relies on heavily throughout his work 
and which we have already seen in action: the definition of an entity is through identifying its 
characteristic, function, proximate cause, and manifestation.52  
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This exercise of noticing the presence of, in our example, “application of thought,” in 
awareness, leads to discerning that it is nāma. Buddhaghosa now defines nāma with a description 
that is etymologically dubious but no less informative for that: 
Having [so] discerned, all of this should be defined as “name” because of the sense of 
“bending” [or applying, inclining to] (namana), from its bending toward the object.53  
What then is it to conceive of the act of thinking, concentrating, feeling, or finding pleasure, as 
“bending towards” (or more fully, bending to “face” towards) its object?54 Buddhaghosa is 
getting at some version of the phenomenological conception of intentionality in modern Western 
thought: the “bending to face” its object is that act’s being “about” or “of” its object.55 To think 
is to think of the object; to feel is to feel about something, and so on. “Aboutness” seems to be 
part of the “bending towards” that characterizes the category of factors called “name”, or perhaps 
also “naming” in the extended sense that the thought names its object. At the same time, 
intentionality in modern Phenomenology is also a property that subjective states have in 
themselves; but this is not a part of what Buddhaghosa means by “nāma”. This later feature, 
which requires the idea of a constructive subjectivity which can be independent of objects, 
already requires that metaphysical concern about the epistemological divide between subject and 
object which is not shared by Buddhaghosa. In fact, we can see that “bending towards” implies, 
if anything, a receptivity by which nāma inclines towards its object. So, with the nāma factors of 
experience, Buddhaghosa includes both intentional and affective dimensions on one side of his 
phenomenological account. (When considering intentionality, we can take nāma  as “naming”, 
and when considering as that which determined by the affectivity56  of its objects, we can of it as 
“name”.) As we go through the details of the subsequent discussion of practices, we will see 
more of how nāma functions as the one side of the phenomenological whole. 
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 Once he discerns nāma factors, the practitioner proceeds to discern and define form, and 
thus comes to distinguish the workings of both. 
Then, like a man following a snake that he has seen at his home, sees its lair, so too one 
familiar with meditation (yoga) ascertains “name” and then looks for the support by 
which this name occurs.  He sees that the “heart form” is its support.  From this he 
discerns that the elementals support the heart form, and that the remaining contingent 
elements support the elementals – [these are what] he discerns as “form”. All of this 
should be defined as “form” because of their being “molested”.57 
One comes to see that one’s various practices of naming are supported in their occurrence by 
something that is “formed,” starting with one’s own heart (the anatomically identifiable locus of 
thinking and feeling).   
 We now have both sides of our phenomenology – the “name/naming” side that inclines 
toward objects of experience in a large set of processes (as we are starting to see) that 
conceptualize and affectively grasp experience, and the “form/formation” side of phenomenal 
objects that are shaped in experience.  This is a fruitful contrast to how intentionality and 
affectivity are worked up as the metaphysical structure of experience in the Western 
Phenomenological tradition. Consider this exemplary description: “Intentionality…describes my 
part in the experience – my need for completeness, for knowledge, for the satisfaction of my 
curiosity; affectivity, on the other hand, describes the object’s play in this situation – how the 
object for its own part can attract my attention because it broadcasts certain features or has some 
special meaning. Thus these two terms, “intentionality” and “affectivity,” describe two sides of 
the same subject-object relation....In fact, Husserl notes this relation: ‘For the object, we can also 
define affection as the awakening of an intention directed towards it’.”58  
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We are clear that a phenomenology must find within it the notions of both intentionality 
and affectivity. However, the Phenomenological tradition, with its metaphysical presupposition 
that the purpose of interrogating experience is to go to the things themselves and arrive at the 
transcendental subject of the experience of those things, sees the “two sides” of experience as the 
subject’s intentionality towards objects and the affectivity of objects upon the subject. With his 
interrogative purpose only being to become purified of the lure of metaphysical views altogether, 
Buddhaghosa’s mapping of experience as nāma and rūpa cuts at 90 degrees across intentionality 
and affectivity. As we will see, he says that the entirety of experience consists in and is animated 
by the dhammas classified by this dyad; so these are the two sides of his phenomenological 
method. But his deployment of them is profoundly anti-metaphysical, just as his analysis is 
fundamentally contemplative (rather than remaining merely analytic). 
 
Multiple methods: contemplative analysis through nāma and rūpa 
Nāma and rūpa are hermeneutic terms for the two sides of experience, on the one side the 
reception and constitution that is the naming of what the meditator undergoes, and on the other 
the form of the occurent content of experience and the formation of the experience as something 
that happens to the meditator. This general identification of how every experience has such 
doubleness is far from any implication of a two-fold ontology of the person who has the 
experience. That the terms are hermeneutical is evident from how the constituents of each term 
vary according to the formula of analysis (vavatthāna) through which the detail (vitthāra) of 
experience is contemplated.  
Now, whereas the first exercise had begun with observing name and led to observing 
form, the subsequent ones do the opposite. The first of these is structured through discernment of 
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the four elementals. As he has previously explained (XI.27ff), in this, the meditator, who had 
hitherto viewed his bodily presence as a being (satta), man (posa) or person (puggala), 
forensically takes apart the whole in contemplative review (pacchavekkhana) – as a butcher cuts 
a carcass so that a cow is no longer seen but only slices of meat – and ceases to have the 
conception of being (sattasaññā) and establishes his attention on the four elementals. His 
experience of himself is thus reworked. In the present chapter, Buddhaghosa sketches out the 
complex tabulation by which the meditator successively discerns an elaborated and extended 
listing of the thirty-two parts of the body (head hairs, body hairs, etc.) (XVIII.5). When attention 
has been worked through all the instances of form as present in experience, the formless factors 
(arūpadhammā) at work in phenomena become manifest in attention too, in all their diversity (he 
gives eighty-one kinds of awareness). These together he sees as “name.” 
This distinction between the formed and the named aspects of the attentive experience of 
bodiliness is not due to an ontological divide in that body between its materiality and its mind, 
for two reasons. The first is that nāma and rūpa can hardly be considered the basis for 
individualizing the person when analytic discernment by the person of himself through the dyad 
is exactly what is meant to deconstruct the intuitive presupposition of an essential personhood. 
The second will become evident as we continue to look at the exercises: a variety of 
classificatory formulae can be used, and while each exercise starts with those factors in 
phenomena that Buddhaghosa directs the meditator to see as “form” (before proceeding to those 
that are to be discerned as “name”), the precise cut between name and form varies in each 
instance, demonstrating the role of the dyad as only a hermeneutic for the analysis of any 
phenomenal moment in contemplative experience. These exercises utilize different formulae by 
which the phenomenal presentation of a human being to himself (i.e., the meditating monk) can 
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be analyzed. In a telling instance, while describing how to exercise contemplation through the 
eighteen components, Buddhaghosa says “ten and half components” are rūpa and seven and a 
half are nāma; but while defining the twelve actuations, then one and a half are nāma and ten and 
a half are rūpa. The line is drawn through the dhammadhātu or dhammāyatana, the factor 
component or factor actuation which is the field of the mind (manas). That is, just as the ear has 
sounds as its field (more technically the ear-component and the ear actuation have sound-
components and sound actuations as their field), so too the mind has factors (whether as 
components or actuations) as the field of its functioning. (So the dhammadhātus are objects of 
mind, not mental objects.) And factors are classified as either name or form. In point of detail, 
rather more than half are nāma factors, and fewer are rūpa factors, and Buddhaghosa simplifies 
it. But that point is made, that the dyadic classification follows the objects of mind according to 
whichever formula is being used in the exercise.  
In any case, the meditator intensifies the focus on the body part (say, a head hair in 
XVIII.5 or sensory component or actuation, say, the eye in XVIII.9-12), and discerns the form of 
its phenomenal factors (its rūpadhammas). Close examination of rūpa factors will lead to 
noticing any of the eighty-one types of awareness that attend our observation of all objects.    
 
Learning from the subtlety of nāma, or how to purify without theorizing  
Now an interesting difference in phenomenological accessibility between nāma and rūpa 
is brought out. Buddhaghosa suggests that even with careful observation of form, name might 
still not arise (na upaṭṭhāti) in the discernment of the meditator due to its “subtlety” 
(sukhumattā).59  If this is the case, the meditator should  
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not give up, but again and again contemplate, attend to, discern, and define just the form. 
To the extent that form becomes cleansed, disentangled, and highly purified, then to that 
extent the formless factors which have [form] as their object (ārammaṇa) themselves 
become evident.60 
He offers a series of metaphors for this process which urge evocative and phenomenologically 
instructive descriptions of the attention required.  When one looks into a dirty mirror and cannot 
see one’s reflection, one needs to polish it again and again until the image of oneself looking 
back becomes clear.  (Polish the object so that it shines back one’s reflexivity.)  Alternatively a 
man trying to get oil from pressing sesame needs to prepare repeatedly the sesame and press with 
the oil press to make it work.  (Keep pressing until the processes of naming emerge.)61 There is 
an acknowledgement that the naming dimension of phenomenality can be more difficult to 
realize in attention, and that sharper attention to form must eventually yield the cognizing 
activities (‘naming’) that grasp it.  It may be easier to notice what is in our experience rather 
than how we are experiencing it.   
What is the “subtlety” or “refinement” in the manifestation of the formless (i.e., ‘name’) 
that makes it more difficult to discern?  The answer emerges through what Buddhaghosa offers 
as the ways through which this difficulty may be overcome. He suggests, it seems paradoxically, 
that three aspects (ākāras) of the phenomenal factors that are formless (arūpadhammā) – contact 
(phassa), feeling (vedanā), or directed cognition (viññāṇa) – themselves become the modes of 
discerning the formless dimension of phenomena. The specificity of the practices he enjoins 
starts to clear up the difficulty. The first example he gives concerns using contact: 
When he discerns the elementals in the way beginning, “The earth elemental has the 
characteristic of hardness,” touch arises for him as the first close contact. Then feeling 
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associated with that as the feeling aggregate arises…[and similarly, the other factors  
through conceptualization (saññā), intention (cetanā), and directed cognition 
(viññāṇa)].62 
Since the meditator knows that the characteristic of earth is hardness or resistance, he can 
ascertain a slight resistance in the instance of a head hair by touching it.  He thus notices his own 
contact (phassa) with it, and has thus identified a naming factor (nāmadhamma).  He may then 
notice a feeling (vedanā) that arises, such as touch being pleasant, as a way of progressively 
discerning the remaining phenomenal factors that are formless (XVIII.20).  We may provide a 
more obvious example to show how intuitive this is. If, say, I am not sure my hand is numb – 
i.e., if I do not feel confident that I can discern the haptic aspect of experience – the thing to do is 
to press my hand against a hard object to concentrate my attention on contact.  
 Does a consideration of these exercises offer a clue for why nāma/arūpa might be the 
more difficult to discern? For Buddhaghosa, the naming, formless side of phenomenality is what 
performs the function of reflexivity, which is a constituent and intrinsic feature of experience. In 
contrast, the phenomenal factors that are classified as form/formation are unidirectional in their 
function – they are the content of the intentional and the source of the affective. That is to say, a 
rūpa factor does not act on itself in phenomena. But those classified as 
name/naming/formlessness function upon themselves. In their case, intentionality and affectivity 
are both reflexive. 
It is entirely in keeping with Buddhaghosa’s practical programme of purification that we 
see no theorization of the nature of experience, including the issue of reflexivity that so occupies 
many philosophical systems contemporary to him. Instead, he focuses on teaching the monk to 
sharpen the functioning of his contemplative practices. Attend to how you experience, study your 
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practices even as they occur, because that study is itself part of the practice. Practice is sufficient 
for the dismantling of the reflex by which the untutored take reflexivity and the objects of 
experience to be marks of a pre-given subject clinging to what it is aware of. That is how we 
must approach the practices in rest of the chapter. 
 
Doing without a subject: the interdependent workings of nāma and rūpa 
Once one has achieved awareness of the processes of both form and name, the meditator 
is enjoined to observe that there is nothing apart from these processes such as a “being,” 
“person,” “deity,” or “Brahmā.” 
Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three 
realms, the eight components, the twelve actualities, the five aggregates, as if one were 
splitting the top of the double palmyra fan or slicing open a box with a knife.  One 
concludes that there is only name and form and nothing beyond them such as a being, 
person, deity, or Brahmā.63 
This kind of analysis of dhammas yields “in a double way” a categorization of all dhammas into 
name and form.  In all phenomena wherever they appear, both sides of our phenomenology are 
present and can be noticed. 
Further, beyond the twofold phenomenological analysis, there is no composite entity of 
“being” or “person.”  Here he offers the famous logic of the chariot: when analyzing its parts, the 
conventional usage of language that describes a composite entity of “chariot” is not used.  An 
analytical exercise with a chariot breaks it up into its functional parts:  wheel, axle, etc.  He 
elaborates the well-known distinction between, on the one hand, the conventional (sammuti) and 
transactional (vohāra) language that identifies grosser entities – chariots, houses, armies, for 
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example – and, on the other, the precise analytic language of a further, deeper meaning 
(paramattha) that breaks these down and identifies their constituent parts.   
It is not obvious how accurate it would be to take Buddhaghosa’s heuristic usage of 
‘conventional’ and ‘further’ (thinking of “para” as “beyond”) to refer to two different “levels” of 
truth or reality. Unlike some Indian Buddhist traditions that take these to refer to truths or 
“levels” of truth, Buddhaghosa takes sammuti and paramattha to refer to two modes of teachings 
(kathā) or language (bhāsā);64 he does not rank them in their descriptive accuracy. Rather they 
are used pragmatically by the Buddha according to subject matter and audience. When the 
Buddha speaks in “such terms as impermanence, suffering, not-self, aggregates, elements, bases, 
and the foundations of mindfulness [he is giving] teachings in the further sense.”65  Conventional 
language is deployed to talk on such subjects as rebirth and karma, shame and apprehension, the 
four divine abidings, giving people gifts, and other conventions of the world.66  And they are 
used according also to audience, as he makes clear with this analogy:   
It is just as a teacher skillful in regional languages commenting on the meaning of the 
three Vedas ascertains that they [ie. his audience] know the meaning when spoken in the 
Tamil language, then speaks to them in the Tamil language.  In the case of another 
language such as the Andhra language, [he speaks] in this or that language…The Lord 
Buddha is like the teacher, the three established piṭakas are like the three Vedas when 
they are to be discussed, being skilled in conventional and further [language] is like being 
skilled in regional languages.67  
The distinction is pedagogical. One does indeed proceed from conventional to further meaning 




With this we can return to the chariot example.  Buddhaghosa then says that “seeing 
correctly is the seeing of one who sees in this way, that from the standpoint of further sense, 
there is only name and form.”68  Here the analytically useful language described as paramattha 
is useful for discerning name and form.  It is vital for our purpose to note that Buddhaghosa uses 
the chariot example to then talk of the continuing dynamic of “seeing”. It is all too easy to think 
what is going on is that the totalizing metaphysics of which the whole chariot is a metaphor (a 
unitary self) is dismantled to leave in its place a decomposed metaphysics of chariot parts – 
whereupon nāma and rūpa become the labels for those parts. Buddhaghosa’s concern is to 
sensitize the meditator to the existentially problematic nature of the metaphysical urge. Resist 
looking for a theory of who you are. What you need is a way of seeing how to not theorize – that 
is to say, not become “obsessed” (pariyuṭṭhati) with “views” (XVIII.30, from the Buddha’s 
words quoted earlier). In other words, it is not Buddhaghosa’s concern to define the parts but to 
practice the taking apart; and for that further purpose, the chariot metaphor has its limitations. 
Buddhaghosa then goes on to offer a simile: nāmarūpa is like a marionette, a mere 
“wooden machine, empty, lifeless, motionless, that walks or stands only through the combination 
of wood and string though it seems to have movement and purpose.”69  In the context of this 
analytical exercise described as the paramattha use of language, there is no agentive “person” or 
“being,” but instead only the complex phenomena described through name and form. 
 The final exercise in this chapter is to discern how name and form are mutually 
interdependent.  They support one another, and when one falls, the other does too, like two 
sheaves of reeds propped up against one another.70  They can only operate together:71  name and 
form are like the cripple and the blind man, who only together have the power to go anywhere. 
Or, they are like a man in a boat such that both man and boat can cross the sea.  
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Lastly, the exercise resists assigning any independent status or agency to either name or 
form, as they are just designations of the mutually supporting dhammas that comprise them: 
 They do not come to be by their own power 
 Nor do they stand by their own power 
 Relying for support on other dhammas 
 They come to be constructed, powerless in themselves.72 
Having crafted the meditator’s vision to see the operations of name and form, the chapter’s final 
tasks are to show their interdependence and to avoid a reification of either of them beyond the 
phenomena.  
 
Some comparative thoughts on the phenomenology of nāmarūpa 
A well-known line of criticism directed at the phenomenological tradition accuses it of 
being in thrall to the search for a transcendental subject, a unitary being that emerges out of the 
details of experience. This line is well stated in the work of Gilles Deleuze. “In relation to 
Husserl specifically, Deleuze’s claim is that without the transcendental privilege accorded to the 
subject…there would be no unity...He suggests that phenomenology is a philosophy that 
conserves a certain essential form, in that ‘the entire dimension of manifestation is given ready-
made, in the position of a transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of 
consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental 
out of the characteristics of the empirical’.”73 Of course, we are not interested in either endorsing 
or defending the tradition that Deleuze criticizes here. But we can use it to drive home the idea 
that this cannot be a criticism of the phenomenological methodology tout court. As we have tried 
to show in this paper, not only is Buddhaghosa’s interrogation of experience not meant to find a 
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transcendental subject, it is meant precisely to therapeutize the contemplative interrogator from 
undertaking such a futile search. 
If phenomenology is the exploration of the conditions for the possibility of manifestation 
(how experience shows itself), and those conditions point – one way or another, whether through 
transcendental reduction (Edmund Husserl) or through radical immanence (Michel Henry) – to 
the Ego, the transcendental subject, then Buddhaghosa’s methodology of course cannot be 
phenomenology. Buddhaghosa, in fact, is committed, to take up Zahavi’s phrase about what a 
phenomenologist supposedly does not do, to “describe the objects as precisely and meticulously 
as possible”; which he does just in order to come to the conclusion that there is no transcendental 
subject required (or possible). But Buddhaghosa’s practices are eminently phenomenological. 
“Phenomenology espouses a rejection of, or at least a withdrawal from, the so-called “natural 
attitude”, which assumes that there is an outside world and other people. In its place, 
phenomenology argues that philosophy must attend to experience, and do away with theoretical 
presuppositions.”74 Buddhaghosa’s contemplative practice does indeed suspend the “natural 
attitude”. But it does so not in order to reject the implicit ontological commitment of that attitude 
and discover the conditions that permit such attitudes to occur at all; his is not a dialectical 
relationship with the attitude that is suspended. Instead, his suspension is such as to attain an 
attitude from which no ontological commitments need be made at all. We could say that he 
suspends the “unnatural attitude” too. 
Conclusion 
When is phenomenology not a Phenomenology? When it folds intentionality and 
affectivity across each other; when it progresses with an examination of experience that suspends 
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the natural attitude due to a contemplative programme, and not due to a thematic concern to 
determine ontology; and for these reasons arrives at precisely the opposite conclusion to 
Phenomenology: whereas Phenomenology seeks to determine the transcendental subject through 
the study of experience, this concludes that the study of experience leaves no need for such a 
subject. And this path, a phenomenological method “all the way down” that Buddhaghosa 
teaches, requires us to see his utilization of the celebrated classical Indian dyad of nāma and 
rūpa in his own way. 
This argument is not only about how to think of phenomenology as a method for 
analyzing experience and not as the quest for an ontology of the subject. We have also sought to 
show that, perhaps more than in much of 20th c Western theorization, in Buddhaghosa we find 
the practical utilization of such a method. This claim is based on a close reading of 
Buddhaghosa; something that has rarely been attempted in competing views of him, as we have 
noted. It would be a welcome development in the study of Buddhaghosa if other scholars were to 
offer further or contrasting interpretations – e.g., as that he engaged in constructing a 
metaphysical dualism – based on such textual analysis rather than on an a priori commitment to 
a picture of abhidhamma and its interpreters.  
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